This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1891 edition. Excerpt: ... PAKT THIRD. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. SECTION FIRST.--THEOREMS FROM METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. THE SOUL AND MATTER. 150. The notion of the soul which some modern systems have unreasonably subjected to suspicion must be restored, although under characteristics hitherto unknown. The soul is a simple essence (Wesen), not merely without parts, but also without any kind of diversity or multiplicity in its quality; hence it has no space relations. In thinking it, however, with other essences, it is included necessarily in space, and for every moment of time it is located in a definite place. This place is the simple in space, or, what is the same, the nothing in space, a mathematical point. Note.--For certain theories of natural philosophy and physiology, but not for psychology, necessary Actions are legitimate, in which the simple is regarded as if it admitted of separation into parts. Such fictions must be employed with reference to the soul's union with the body, but without, for that reason, ascribing to the soul itself any real space conditions whatever. The fictions of geometricians are in some respects similar when they regard the curve as consisting of indefinitely short straight lines. 151. Furthermore the soul has no time relations. In thinking, however, wherein it is included with other essences, it must be conceived as in time and indeed as in eternity, although this eternity, and still more the temporal duration, must not be predicated of the soul. (Introd. to Phil., 115 ) 152. The soul has no innate natural talents nor faculties whatever, either for the purpose of receiving or for the purpose of producing. It is, therefore, no tabula rasa in the sense that impressions foreign to itself may be made upon it;...